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ADmINISTRATIVE LAW-SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE-COMMISSIONER'S
DISSENT AS PART OF THE RECORD AS A WHOLE-The Wagner Act pro-
vision that on review of NLRB decisions "the findings of the Board as to
the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive" I was interpreted
to mean that "substantial evidence" was required.2 However, in the actual
application of the rule dissatisfaction arose from the tendency of some
courts to examine only the Board's side of the recprd to determine whether
the evidence met the test of substantiality.8 Then came the provisions of
the Taft-Hartley 4 and Administrative Procedure 5 Acts stating that find-
ings must be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 6 the Supreme Court held that by
these provisions broadening the scope of review, Congress had expressed
a mood which could serve only as a standard for judgment and not as a
rigid rule for determining substantiality.7 To emphasize the change, the
Court pointed to the trial examiner's report as bearing on substantiality,
particularly when credibility is an important issue, because of his first hand
observation of the demeanor and conduct of witnesses. Thus the report
of the trial examiner was to be considered in examining the record as a
whole.
8
A complaint filed with the FTC charged that a corporation's quantity
discount pricing .system in the sale of automatic temperature controls had
the effect of substantially lessening competition.9 The sole issue was
whether respondent's pricing system produced the alleged effect. Finding
1. 49 STAT. 449, 554 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1946).
2. Waslington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1938). "Substantial
evidence" was then defined as "more than a mere scintilla" in Consolidated Edison
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1939), and later as enough to justify a refusal to direct a
verdict in a jury trial in NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292 (1939).
3. Examples of this reasoning are found in NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper
Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942) and NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U.S. 206
(1940).
4. 61 STAT. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (Supp. 1951).
5. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1946).
6. 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see also Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence
on the Whole Record," 64 HARv. L. Rrv. 1233 (1951).
7. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
8. In the circuit court decision of the Universal Camera case the findings of the
trial examiner were not considered. Judge Learned Hand stated that the court could
find no middle ground between considering the Board's reversal and treating such
reversal as error whenever it would be such if done by a judge to a master in equity.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950). On remand from
the Supreme Court, Judge Hand again delivered the opinion in which he reversed
his position and stated his reasons for agreeing with the Court's mandate that the
examiner's findings be considered. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 429
(2d Cir. 1951).
9. Clayton Act, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as
amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(a), (b) (1946).
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that it did not, the trial examiner recommended that the complaint be dis-
missed. The FTC rendered contrary findings, from which Commissioner
Mason dissented, and issued a cease and desist order.10 On appeal the
circuit court reversed the Commission's order and, relying on the Universal
Camera case, considered not only the trial examiner's report but also Com-
missioner Mason's dissent as part of the record for the purpose of deter-
mining substantiality. The court justified this practice on the ground that
evidence may be even less substantial when one of the Commissioners is
not persuaded by the independent findings of the Commission.10a Minne-
apolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 191 F.2d.
786 (7th Cir. 1951).
The reasoning of the court in this case applies the Universal Camera
doctrine." However, the usefulness of a dissent would appear to be
limited. Since commissioners have no opportunity to observe the wit-
nesses, a dissent is valueless as to credibility. At the other extreme, in
decisions based on administrative discretion a dissent is immaterial be-
cause the courts review such decisions only as to reasonableness and not
as to substantiality of evidence.12  Somewhere between, there is an area in
which the special competence of the commissioners is applied to making
findings of fact and drawing inferences therefrom. Here it is that a dissent
may be indicative of the substantiality of the evidence-to the extent that
the dissent rests upon the special ability of the commissioner. Yet the
very complexity of determining what is fact or policy or a mixture thereof
accents the difficulty of properly utilizing a dissent.
Within these confines the fact of a dissent is likely to be less significant
than the identity and reputation of the dissenter and the intrinsic merit of
the dissent. No doubt it is from this point of view that many courts have
always considered dissents. Certainly a dissent, even more than a trial
examiner's report, should be given only that incalculable weight which
"in reason and the light of judicial experience" it deserves.' 3 In attempting
to weigh the effect of an administrative dissent, the instant court grasped
vainly at an elusive, mocking wisp in the atmosphere which envelops agency-
court relationships.
10. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 400 (1948) (dissenting
opinion).
10a. See Wyman Gordon Co. (Ingalls-Shepard Division) v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480
(1946); NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721 (1943); B. & 0. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 362 (1936).
11. In Folds v. FTC, 187 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1951), argued before Judge Kerner
who wrote the opinion in the instant case, the court held that where the trial ex-
aminer's findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence the action of
the Commission in rejecting them is arbitrary. But in New York Central R.R. v.
United States, 99 F. Supp. 394 (D. Mass. 1951), the court merely cited the Universal
Camera case for the proposition that the whole record was to be considered, but went
on to decide the case practically de novo.
12. Jaffe, supra note 6, at 1260.
13. Having decided that the examiner's findings are to be considered, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter says, "We do not require the examiner's findings to be given more weight
than in reason and the light of judicial experience they deserve." Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).
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AGENCY-CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP-INFORMATION AcQUIRED AS
AGENT-DuTY OF LOYALTY-CONSTRUCTIVE TRusT-An unlettered
grantor purchased a tract of, land from the commissioners of his county
and, relying on an erroneous survey prepared for him by an engineer, be-
lieved that he had purchased more land than he in fact did. Having con-
tracted with several grantees for the sale of land which he did not own,
he requested the local justice of the peace, a man of some learning,' to pre-
pare the deeds of conveyance for him.2 Although on several occasions the
conveyancer told the grantor that he doubted the validity of the title and
that he thought the commissioners had advertised the sale of the disputed
lands at public auction, the grantor refused to accept his advice and ordered
the preparation of- the deeds. After the grantees had begun construction
on the land the conveyancer purchased title to it at public auction. The
grantor, upon learning of this transaction, brought equity proceedings to
have the conveyancer declared constructive trustee of the land. The chan-
cellor decided in favor of the conveyancer, but on appeal the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that the conveyancer, although working
for a set fee, was the grantor's agent and confidential advisor, and that
he had breached his duty of loyalty. The dissent s contended that there
was no agency or confidential relationship, but even if there were the con-
veyancer was not a constructive trustee because he neither had control
over nor in any way brought about the sale.4 Chalupiak v. Stahlnan, 368
Pa. 83, 81 A.2d 577 (1951).
This decision squarely raises the question of the extent to which equity
will employ the constructive trust to remedy the effects of utilization, for
personal advantage, of information received in the course of a relationship.
While fiduciaries are "held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place," 5 a pin-pointed definition of what constitutes a fiduciary re-
lationship is impossible because of the courts' reluctance to define the con-
1. "It is obvious from his testimony that plaintiff is an unlettered man. Defend-
ant, . . on the contrary, in addition to his employment in an adjacent factory or
mill, was a justice of the peace and also the tax collector. He maintained a business
office with a paid assistant. For fees he drew wills, contracts and other papers, took
affidavits and acknowledgments and prepared income tax returns. Defendant was
obviously a type of country squire, of some education, whom people of the area con-
sulted for many purposes and in whom doubtless his clients reposed a great con-
fidence." Instant case at 86, 81 A.2d at 579.
2. While ordinarily it is the grantee who has the burden of preparing the deeds,
in some counties the grantor assumes that burden. 2 LADNMz, REAL EsTATE CON-
VEYANCING §204 (1941).
3. The decision was 6-1. Justice Bell Dissented.
4. But see RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS § 170, comment b (1939). "The trustee cannot
properly purchase trust property for himself even though he does not make the sale.
Thus, he cannot properly purchase trust property for himself on a foreclosure sale
or a tax sale or sale on execution of judgment. To permit him to do so would create
a situation where his personal interest would be in conflict with his duty as trus-
tee. .. ." (Emphasis supplied).
5. Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(1928).
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cept precisely; 1 and also because the term represents a conclusion of law
in some cases and a conclusion of fact in others.7 However, it is said gen-
erally that a confidential relationship--and hence a high standard of loyalty
-- exists in cases where there has been a special confidence reposed in one
who in equity and good cotiscience is bound to act in good faith and with
due iegard for the interests of the one reposing the confidence.8  Such a
relationship usually exists in cases of principal-agent, 9 trustee-beneficiary,
guardian-ward and other recognized legal relationships,'0 but the origin of
the influence and confidence is immaterial; it may be moral, social, domestic
or merely personal." The most that can be said is that certain factors
predispose a court to grant relief.'2 In the instant case the court decided
that the conveyancer acted in a greater capacity than would a stenographer
and that since he was the repository of confidential information while act-
ing in the grantor's behalf,' 3 he was the agent of the grantor.' 4 It was on
this seemingly tenuous agency 15 that the court found a confidential rela-
tionship. The court then had little difficulty in finding a breach of the
duty of loyalty, and granted relief via the constructive trust route. It is
settled law that an agent,' 6 like other fiduciaries, 17 may not use informa-
tion acquired during the relationship to the detriment of his principal with-
out the express consent of his principal. The court labeled the convey-
6. Note, Confidential Relationships in Pennsylvania Law, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV.
712 (1949). One of the strongest reasons for this judicial reluctance is that a precise
definition would lessen the effectiveness of the constructive trust. Id. at 724. The
Note contains an excellent survey of the law governing confidential relationships.
7. Id. at 724.
8. E.g., Drob v. Jaffe, 351 Pa. 297, 300, 41 A.2d 407, 408 (1945) ; Miller v. Hen-
derson, 140 Kan. 46, 33 P.2d 1098 (1934) ; Patton v. Shelton, 328 Mo. 631, 40 S.W.2d
706 (1931) ; Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22, 25, 117 At. 410, 411 (1922).
9. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 13 (1933). "An agent is a fiduciary with respect
to matters within the scope of his agency." But cf. Grace v. Moll, 285 Pa. 353, 354,
132 Atl. 171 (1926).
10. E.g., Dylbie v. Dylbie, 389 Ill. 326, 59 N.E.2d 657 (1945) ; Snow v. Merchants
National Bank, 309 Mass. 354, 35 N.E.2d 213 (1940).
11. E.g., Catherwood v. Morris, 345 Ill. 617, 178 N.E. 487 (1931) ; Leedom v.
Palmer, 274 Pa. 22, 25, 117 Atl. 410, 411 (1922).
12. Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 712, 724 (1949). Among these factors are:
. that a relation of dependency on one side and domination on the other is indi-
cated by extreme age or youth, physical or mental weakness, or lack of education or
business experience of the confiding party; or that close contacts engendered by family
connection, long and intimate friendship, residential proximity, or association born
of common interest in matters of property make it more likely than not that the
complainant dealt without the vigilance which generally characterizes dealings with
a stranger. No single factor is decisive; the effect is cumulative ... " Id. at 724.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 1 (1933). "(1) Agency is the relationship which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."
15. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 12-14 (1933).
16. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 395 (1933).
17. See 2 Scott, TRUsTs § 170 (1939); 3 id. §§ 504, 505; Scott, The Trustee's
Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REv. 521 (1936).
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ancer's action ag a transparent attempt to put the "squeeze" on the
grantor.
18
The law of constructive trusts is now in a period of expansion; the
cases indicate a growing tendency of the courts to liberalize the basic re-
quirements for the construction of trusts to prevent overreaching.19 Essex
Trust Co. v. Enwright 20 was one of the early cases which heralded this
trend. There a trust was constructed without a finding of a fiduciary rela-
tionship where a newspaper reporter learned, in the course of his employ-
ment, of the peculiar value of a lease to his employer, and after acquiring
the lease for himself attempted to sell it to his employer. Some thirty years
later the court went even further in Hamberg v. Barsky 21 in constructing
a trust when one storekeeper persuaded a neighbor to let him negotiate
for a renewal of their leases and then acquired the lease for himself. Al-
though it was said that the Barsky case strained the law to its outermost
limits, 22 the instant decision seems to go beyond the Barsky decision.
While it may be argued that the agency in the instant case was at best
tenuous, it seems nonetheless true that at least the fundamental require-
ments of an agency were present.23 But even absent an agency relationship,
a sense of social responsibility compels approval of the result in this case.
Undoubtedly the constructive trust is a potent weapon in the hands of the
court of conscience where the parties did not deal at arm's length. Although
a continuation of the trend toward the liberal attitude of constructing trusts
may impose an unduly high standard of conduct upon those who are re-
positories of confidential information, there are compelling reasons which
call for approval of that attitude. The fact remains that the concept of con-
fidential relationship is a legal conclusion and it is within the chancellor's
discretion to say when and where that relation exists. It is doubtful whether
any court will go a great deal further in constructing a trust, and the
boundary cases have such peculiar fact situations that they lose much of
their precedent value. The probable significance of the cases is that this
remedy will be taken only where there is manifest abuse of confidence and
the courts will be unwilling to go so far where that abuse is less patent.
18. Instant case at 89, 81 A.2d at 580.
19. E.g., Tyler v. Tyler, 54 R.I. 254, 172 Atl. 820 (1934) (father and son);
Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co. 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929), recent case
in 43 HARv. L. REv. 970 (1930) (manufacturer learned of dominating patent) ; Horn
Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640 (1929) (former employee);
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (former partners) ; Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378 (1919) (mining en-
gineer) ; H. C. Girard Co. v. Lamoureux, 227 Mass. 277, 116 N.E. 572 (1917) (de-
posed president and director of corporation). See also cases cited in 3 SCOTT,
TRuSTS §§ 504, 505 (1939). For an interesting English case see Wessex Dairies
Ltd. v. Smith, 153 L.T. 185 (Ct. of App. 1935), recent case in 22 VA. L. REV. 359
(1936) (milkman starting his own dairy).
20. 214 Mass. 507, 102 N.E. 441 (1913).
21. 355 Pa. 462, 50 A.2d 345 (1947), discussed in Note, 97 U. OF P.- L. REV.
712, 723 (1949).
22. Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 712, 724 (1949).
23. See note 14 supra.
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However the decisions serve as reminders that overreaching is not beyond
the potent arm of equity so that "not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." 24 The watch-
ful eye of equity in this way will preserve the level "of conduct for fidu-
ciaries at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."2 5
APPEAL AND ERRoR-FINALITY OF O1RER DISMISSING CLAIM WHILE
COUNTERCLAIM REMAINS PENDING--Plaintiff brought suit in the federal
district court to compel defendant to execute a divisional application for a
patent and to enjoin defendant from dealing with the invention as his own.
Defendant answered and counterclaimed that, although plaintiff possessed
legal title to the invention, defendant was the equitable owner and entitled
to compensation. Thereafter, defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's
claim, showing that since the institution of suit he had executed a divisional
patent application in form desired by plaintiff. After hearing on the motion,
the district court concluded that defendant had performed all acts as to
which specific performance could be decreed under the complaint and that
the remaining issues could be decided on subsequent adjudication of the
counterclaim. An order was issued dismissing the complaint in accordance
with the formula prescribed by revised rule 54(b). On appeal it was held
that since the claim and counterclaim arose out of the same transaction, the
order disposing only of the claim was not a final decision from which an
appeal would lie. Bendix Aviation Corporation v. John P. Glass, Jr., 3d
Cir., Sept. 6, 1951.
In the federal judicial system a "final decision" is required as a condi-
tion precedent to appeal.' Prior to the adoption of the federal rules of civil
procedure this requirement was interpreted as permitting an appeal only
after all issues as to all parties had been adjudicated.2 An exception to the
general rule was the infrequent holding which recognized an adjudication,
final as to a matter distinct from the general subject matter of the litigation,
as separately appealable although the entire controversy had not yet been
determined.3 This construction of final decision rarely resulted in hardship
since suits were generally confined to one cause of action. When the federal
rules permitted a litigant to join several claims and counterclaims 4 based
24. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
25. Ibid.
1. 26 STAT. 828 (1891), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1949): "The
courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the dis-
trict courts of the United States ... "
2. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1919); see Louisiana Navigation Co.
v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana, 226 U.S. 99, 101 (1912) ; Winters v. Ethel, 132
U.S. 207, 209 (1889); Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. 591, 595 (U.S. 1854); Western
Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 37 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Radio Corp.
of America v. J.H. Bunnell and Co., 298 Fed. 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1924).
3. Central Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135 U.S. 207 (1890) ; Williams
v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684 (1884) ; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
4. FzD. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
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on widely separated transactions, it was thought that to prevent finality
as to such separate matters would cause undesirable inconvenience and
delay to the potential appellant. 5 This consideration led to the adoption of
the original rule 54(b) which provided: "When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination
of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising
out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim,
may enter a judgment disposing of such claim." This rule was construed
as merely restating the previous exception to the general rule.0 But differ-
ent conceptual approaches to the rule left adjudications under it in serious
conflict. Difficulty azose as to the meaning of "claim" and "counterclaims
arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the claim." 7 If the appellate court adopted a liberal meaning of "claim",
an order dismissing less than all of the claims and counterclaims would not
be a final decision.8 If the court adopted a more restricted concept of
"claim," the order would be an appealable final decision.9 Due to this un-
certainty as to what was a distinct claim a potential appellant would be
forced to take an appeal from virtually all judgments entered under the
rule to avoid finding later that the judgment was final and the appeal time
had run. The revision of rule 54(b) was intended to reduce this uncer-
tainty as -to when an appeal might be taken.10 It provides: "When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of
the claims only upon an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." No
longer were district courts required to inquire whether the claims or coun-
terclaims arose out of the same transaction. The prescribed requirements
5. See Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Manufacturing Co., 136 F.2d 621, 624 (2d
Cir. 1943) ; Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1939) ;
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 3156 (1938); REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DisnucT COuRTS OF THE UNITED STATES 70
(1946).
6. See Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., 154 F.2d 814,
817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 859 (1946); Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Manu-
facturing Co., 136 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1943) ; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3155
(1938) ; REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RuLEs OF CIvIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
DisTRicr COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 70 (1946).
7. The following cases found the counterclaim to be separate and appealable;
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1943); Clair
v. Kastar, 138 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Big Cola Corp. v. World Bottling Co., 134
F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1943); Isenburg v. Biddle, 125 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir.
1941). For cases where the court found the counterclaim arose out of the same
transaction as the claim, see Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 159 F.2d
349 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir.
1944) ; Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 115 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1940).
8. See Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1-947) ; Studer v. Moore, 153 F.2d
902 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Wright v. Gibson, 128 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Cohen v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 120 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1941).
9. See Hanney v. Franklin Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F.2d 864
(9th Cir. 1944); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940);
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939).
10. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1949).
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of an express determination and direction were to clarify what was intended
with reference to finality," and it was thought that the district court could
now make final an order that would not have been final under the original
rule.1 2  But the instant court refused to interpret the revised rule as per-
mitting an appeal when no appeal would have lain prior to the revision.
Certainty as to the time when an appeal may be taken has not been at-
tained if the court of appeals may disregard the district court's entry of
final judgment. It has already been recognized that under the revised rule
the circuit court of appeals may not exercise its appellate jurisdiction un-
less the required determination and direction have been made by the district
judge.13 If there is to be a rule permitting appeals from orders which dis-
pose of less than all the claims in controversy, the district court is best able
to appraise the transactions in issue and determine what are distinct claims
for the purposes of trial convenience. Unless such a rule is to operate to
the detriment of litigants, who must of necessity be informed of their rights
of appeal, the determination of the district court must be accepted.
BANKRUPTCY-HoMESTEAD EXEMPTION-MEANING OF "STRONG-
ARM" CLAUSE OF SECTION 70(c) OF BANKRUPTCY ACT-EXTENT TO
WHICH STATE LAw CONTROLS-Three days after the filing of a petition
and an adjudication in bankruptcy, the bankrupt filed for record a declara-
tion of homestead, and claimed a homestead exemption as provided by Cali-
foria law.' The Referee refused to allow the exemption on the ground
that § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act put the trustee in bankruptcy in the
position of a creditor holding a lien under state law by legal or equitable
proceedings,2 and that under California law a judgment creditor with a lien
11. Ibid.
12. See Moore, COmENTARY ON THE Um=En STATES JUDICrAL CODE 517 (1949).
13. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951);
Lyman v. Remington Rand, Inc., 188 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Winsor v. Daunmit,
179 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Kaufman and Ruderman, Inc. v. Cohn and Rosenberger,
177 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1949).
1. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1240 (Deering, 1949). Nearly every state has a statute pro-
tecting homesteads up to a certain value from the levy of particular classes of credi-
tors; the purpose being to protect the family, and to prevent persons from becoming
charges upon the community. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see Haskins,
Honestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950).
2. 64 STAT. 26, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (Supp. 1951). Section 70(c) so far as is
applicable reads: ". . . The trustee, as to all property of the bankrupt at the date
of the bankruptcy whether or not coming into the possession or control of the court,
shall be deemed vested as of the date of the bankruptcy with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by legal or equitable proceedings,
whether or not such a creditor actually exists." (Emphasis added.) The applicable
portion of the present § 70(c) appeared first in the Bankruptcy Act in § 47a (2) (36
STAT. 840 (1910), 11 U.S.C. § 75(a) (1934)) dealing with the duties of the trustee.
Its change of position was in the interest of logical arrangement, (52 STAT. 881
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1946)) and did not have interpretative significance.
See 4 CoL.IR, BANKRUPTCY § 70.47 (14th ed. 1942) ; MacLachlan, Section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act, 24 J.N.A. REP. BANKR. 107 (1950).
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prevailed over a homestead declaration recorded after he acquired his lien.3
On appeal, the district court recognized that the lien of a judgment creditor
prevailed over a later recorded homestead declaration, but held the decla-
ration valid as against the trustee,4 reasoning that a judgment creditor in
California does not hold his lien "by legal or equitable proceedings" within
the meaning of § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. The lien arises from the
recording of the abstract of judgment under California law,5 and the act
of recordation is no part of the legal or equitable proceeding which gave
rise to the judgment. The circuit court of appeals affirmed the judgment
and approved the reasoning saying, inter alia, that "legal or equitable pro-
ceedings" means "judicial" proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. Samp-
sell v. Straub, 189 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1951).
It is well established that a bankrupt's right to exemptions is deter-
mined by the existing law of the state in which he lives.0 Pursuant to this
White v. Stump 7 decided that in Idaho, where state law provided that
land should be subject to the satisfaction of judgments obtained before the
declaration of homestead was filed, the trustee in bankruptcy prevailed
over a homestead declaration filed after the petition in bankruptcy. In
Myers v. Matley 8 the Supreme Court cited with approval the general doc-
trine of the Stump case, i.e., that the rights of the parties become fixed
at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, but distinguished it on
the ground that the law of Nevada did not condition the homestead exemp-
tion upon filing, but created a persisting right in the bankrupt to declare
his exemption at any time before actual sale. Under the Nevada law,
therefore, a subsequently recorded homestead exemption prevailed over the
claims of the trustee.9 The California law pertaining to homestead ex-
emptions 10 is substantially a duplication of the Idaho law involved in the"
Stump case, so it would seem clear that the instant case would be within
the rule of the Stump case if a judgment creditor in California held his
lien "by legal or equitable proceedings" within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act."
The "strong-arm clause" of § 70(c) was designed to circumvent the
holding of the Supreme Court in York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell,12 and to give
3. CA.i Crv. CODE §§ 1240-1241 (Deering, 1949).
4. In re Curmar Mfg. Co., 91 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
5. CAL CODE Civ. PRoc. § 674 (Deering, Supp. 1951).
6. 30 STAT. 548 (1898), 11 U.S.C. 524 (1934), as amended, 52 STAT. 847, 11
U.S.C. § 24 (1946); White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310 (1924).
7. 266 U.S. 310 (1924).
8. 318 U.S. 622 (1943).
9. Compare IDAHO CODE § 55-1005 (1948), with NE VADA Comp. LAWS § 3315
(Hillyer, 1929).
10. CAL Crv. CODE §§ 1240-1241 (Deering, 1949).
11. See note 3 sitpra.
12. 201 U.S. 344 (1906). See 45 CoNG. REc. 2277 (1910), quoted in 4 CoL.mR,
op. cit. stpra note 2, § 70A7. The Cassell case held that the trustee stood in the shoes
of the bankrupt, and was without power to avoid an unrecorded conditional sales con-
tract in the absence of the actual existence of a lien creditor.
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the trustee power to avoid secret or unrecorded liens which were valid
against the bankrupt. It has repeatedly been said that the clause gives
the trustee the status of an "ideal" 13 or "perfect" '14 lien holder, and that
his status is conferred by operation of federal law.' 5 It is held that the
trustee has those rights which a creditor holding a lien would have if
there had been no bankruptcy.' The trustee's status is not dependent
upon the actual existence of any such creditor,' 7 and actual notice to all
creditors has been held not to affect the rights of the trustee,' 8 although
such notice would make the creditor impotent to attack the unrecorded
lien. In short, the entire history of the clause has been that of broad in-
terpretation.' 9
The present decision finds a limitation in the words "by legal or equi-
table proceedings" upon the reasoning that if Congress had meant any
lien, no matter how obtained, it would have said just that.20 However,
from the purpose of the clause and its broad application over the past
forty years, it would appear that "legal or equitable" was used to indicate
an encompassing of both fields rather than a limitation, i.e., that the trustee
was to be put in the position of the strongest lien creditor, regardless of
whether the lien arose from an action at law or at equity. The practical
effect of this decision is to render the strong-arm clause inoperative in
California and other states whose laws condition the acquiiing of a judg-
ment lien upon the act of recording,21 for in these states there can be no
creditor who holds his lien by legal or equitable proceedings. It would be
indeed surprising that Congress should have intended an interpretation so
inconsistent with any notion of uniformity. The cases declare that the
trustee gets his status as a judgment lien creditor by operation of the
Bankruptcy Act; 22 nowhere does it appear that the state law regarding
the procedure by which liens are perfected is to be read into the Act as a
condition to*the trustee's acquiring this status. The novelty of the stand
taken in this case becomes more readily apparent upon observing that the
13. See Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1950) ; In
re Calhoun Supply Co., 189 Fed. 537 (N.D. Ala. 1911).
14. See In re Allee, 55 F.2d 76, 77 (7th Cir. 1932).
15. See Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 185 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1951);
Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Robbins v. Bostian,
135 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Pacific State Bank v. Coats, 205 Fed. 618, 622
(9th Cir. 1913).
16. National Bank of Bakersfield v. Moore, 247 Fed. 913 (9th Cir., 1918) ; In re
Lane Lumber Co., 217 Fed. 550 (9th Cir. 1914); In re Pittsburg-Big Muddy Coal
Co., 215 Fed. 703 (7th Cir. 1914), and cases cited therein.
17. Heath v. Helmick, 173 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1949); Robbins v. Bostian, 135
F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1943).
18. Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1950).
19. For a complete history of section 70(c) and collection of cases, see 4 CoLLIER,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 70.45 et seq.
20. Instant case at 381.
21. See, e.g., 4 MicH. ComP. LAWS §623.83 (1948); 9 OHio GEx. CoPE'ANN.
§ 11656 (Page, 1938); 1 ORE. Comp. LAws AxN. §6-801 (1940).
22. See note 15 supra.
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recording provision upon which it is based has been settled law in Cali-
fornia since before the turn of the century,2 yet no reported case accords
the slightest hospitality to the instant court's position. Indeed, it appears
that the question has seldom been raised by counsel or the court, and
where it has been raised, it has been resolved in favor of the trustee.
2 4
Cases decided from other states of the Ninth Circuit with recording statutes
similar to that of California have likewise failed to reach the result of
the instant case.25  In White v. Pacific Southwest Trust & Savings
Bank,26 it was held that the trustee was vested with all the rights of a judg-
ment creditor who had properly filed a lis pendens, and that therefore he
could avoid unrecorded conveyances. It is difficult to understand why,
if the present decision is correct, the filing of a lis pendens in California
is a "legal proceeding," and the filing of an abstract judgment is not, when
the effect of both is to give notice to all concerned that an encumbrance
has been perfected upon the property.2' If the reasoning of the present
decision is carried to its logical conclusion, a trustee in California will be
impotent to attack an unrecorded conditional sales contract, 28 the very
purpose for which the strong-arm clause was amended by the Chandler
Act.
29
Unfortunate as the result in the instant case may be from the standpoint
of precedent, there are practical considerations which make it desirable
on its own facts, if not doctrinally sound. One of the principle purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act is to relieve an honest debtor from the oppression of
23. CAL. CODE OF Civ. PROC. §§ 897-900 (Newmark, 1883); CAL. CoDE oF Cirv.
PROC. § 674 (Deering, Supp. 1951). The provisions of 1883 have remained substan-
tially unchanged to date.
24. Coopman v. Citizens State Bank of Omak, 83 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1937); Georgouses v. Gillen, 24 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 600 (1928). These cases both involved homestead
declarations filed too late. Whatever factors might be claimed to differentiate the
instant case from other cases involving unrecorded or secret liens were present here,
but in neither case was there any doubt that the trustee prevailed. See also, White
v. Pacific Southwest Trust & Savings Bank, 9 F.2d 650, 662 (S.D. Cal. 1926),
modified on appeal sub nom. Johns v. United Bank & Trust Co., 15 F.2d 300 (9th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 753 (1926), where it was said inter alia, "...
Neither can there be any doubt that the Plaintiff, by virtue of the filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy, was thereby vested with all the rights of a judgment creditor
who had properly filed a lis pendens under the laws of California"'
25. E.g., Scandinavian-American Bank v. Sabin, 227 Fed. 579 (9th Cir. 1915);
1 OmE. Comp. LAws ANN. § 6-801 (1940). The law in Oregon has not changed
since the case cited was decided. See also, In re Cobb, 14 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.
Mich. 1936), where a Michigan statute required an execution to be filed in order to
perfect a lien against a bona fide conveyance. The court there said, ". . . such
trustee must . . . be deemed to' have complied with all the requirements prescribed
by the Michigan statute just quoted as necessary to the acquisition of such a lien,
including the filing of the notice so prescribed.' (Emphasis added)
26. 9 F.2d 650 (S.D. Cal. 1926), modified on appeal sub nwin. Johns v. United
Bank & Trust Co., 15 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 753 (1926).
See note 23 supra.
27. CArL CoDE oF CIrv. PRoc. § 409 (Deering, 1937) ; Lee v. Silva, 197 Cal. 364,
240 Pac. 1015 (1925).
28. CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 2980-2980.5 (Deering, Supp. 1951).
29. See note 12 supra.
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his debts, and to allow him to start anew.0 The exemptions which state
law permits are incorporated in § 6 31 to give the bankrupt some stake with
which to make his fresh start. It may be urged from this that § 70(c),
designed as it was to allow the trustee to defeat secret or unrecorded liens,
was never meant to operate so as to deprive the bankrupt of his home-
stead exemption, i.e., that homesteads are different from secret liens, and
§ 70 (c) should not apply to defeat one of the principal purposes of the Act.
Inhibiting the adoption of this position in a case like the instant one, how-
ever, is the clear language of § 6 determining the extent of the exemptions,
and the Supreme Court's decision in White v. Stump approving the domi-
nation of state law on exemptions despite the fact that the homestead decla-
ration was defeated. The decision in the instant case may mirror a reluc-
tance of the court to allow a result inconsistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Act, but an unwillingness to face squarely the
holding in White v. Stump.
CHARITABLE CORPORATIONs-DIsCRIMINATION IN MEMBERSHIP
POLIcIEs-The defendant Young Women's Christian Association is a non
profit corporation, incorporated under the laws of New Jersey. In con-
formity with the statute,' the association's certificate of incorporation sets
forth the purposes for which the corporation was formed, which are the
improvement of the spiritual, intellectual, social and physical condition of
young women. The certificate does not include membership qualifications,
but subsequently adopted by-laws provide that any woman properly intro-
duced or giving satisfactory reference as to character may become a member.
The plaintiffs were members of the community who had applied for voting
membership in the Y.W.C.A., and sought to enjoin the defendant associa-
tion from denying it to them. The Superior Court found that the appli-
cants had all of the qualifications set forth in the statute, certificate of incor-
poration and by-laws and ordered them admitted to voting membership.
Leeds v. Harrison, 83 A.2d 45 (N.J.Ch. 1951).
The defendant Y.W.C.A. being a non-profit corporation organized for
the benefit of an indefinite number of young women in the community is a
charity.2 Whether the charity is administered as a trust or as a corpora-
tion, equity will enforce the proper use of the property by the trustees as
30. See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 225 U.S. 459 (1913).
31. "This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the state laws in force
at the time of the filing of petition ... " 30 STAT. 548 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. 1950).
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1-1 (1898).
2. A charitable use is a gift to the general public and may be applied to any
purpose that tends to promote the well being of the society. See Leeds v. Harrison,
7 N.J. Eq. 558, 567, 72 A.2d 371, 376 (Ch. 1950) ; Betts v. Y.M.C.A. of Erie, 83 Pa.
Super. 545, 550 (1924).
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set forth in the instrument creating the trust or in the certificate of in-
corporation.3 However, the courts are reluctant to delve into the internal
affairs of charities and grant relief in situations where the majority of the
members or the board of trustees have acted bona fide and with seemingly
good discretion in administering the funds and property of the organi-
zation.4  Equity has insisted upon evidence of misuse of funds and prop-
erty to the degree that the purposes of the charity or corporation have been
contravened before relief will be given.5 No case before the present one
has involved the problem of membership in charities. In related fields,
however, courts are generally loath to interfere with the membership poli-
cies of any organization. In the absence of statutory or charter restric-
tions, private corporations may exclude any persons they see fit, and the
courts will not interfere." However courts will occasionally intervene to
protect the individual interests of members arbitrarily expelled from an
organization in violation of its rules and regulations.7 With regard to trade
unions the traditional answer to the membership question has been that
there is no right to join a union, as there is no right to join any private
corporation.8 However, in the light of gross injustice and hardship to
individuals excluded from unions which serve as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives, courts have attempted to remedy the situation by forcing such
unions to represent union and non-union members without discrimination
against the latter.9
In view of the reluctance of courts to involve themselves in the in-
ternal affairs of private organizations, the injuries suffered by the ex-
cluded plaintiffs here would not appear to be of such magnitude as to war-
rant judicial interference. Certainly exclusion from voting membership in
the Y.W.C.A. is not on a par with the severe injuries that may result
from denial of membership in a union, and even in the latter situation
courts will grant only an alternative remedy. Nor do the expulsion cases
3. Cf. Greek Orthodox Community v. Malincourtis, 267 Mass. 472, 166 N.E.
863 (1929); In re Flushing Hospital & Digpensary, 288 N.Y. 125, 41 N.E.2d 917
(1942); Allred v. Beggs, 125 Tex. 584, 84 S.W.2d 223 (1935).
4. See Ross v. Freeman, 21 Del. Ch. 44, 58, 180 Atl. 527, 534 (Ch. 1935) ; Love-
lace v. Marion Institute, 215 Ala. 271, 272, 110 So. 381, 382 (1926).
5. Bailey v. People, 79 Colo. 386, 246 Pac. 205 (1926) ; In re Flushing Hospital
& Dispensary, 288 N.Y. 125, 41 N.E.2d 917 (1942); Com. ex rel. v. Seventh Day
Baptists, 317 Pa. 358, 176 Atl. 17 (1934).
6. 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDiA CORPORATiONs, 972 (Perm. ed. 1931); North
Dakota v. North Central Ass'n., 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
7. Gleeson v. Conrad, 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 276 App. Div.
861, 93 N.Y.S.2d 667 (2d Dep't 1949); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67,
113 Atl. 70 (1921); Chaffee, The Internal Affairs of Associations tot for Profit,
43 H~Av. L. Rxv. 993 (1930).
8. Mayer v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association, 47 NJ. Eq. 519, 20 Atl.
492 (Ch. 1890); Miller v. Ruehl, 166 N.Y. Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677 (1941).
9. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Supreme Court
held that the chosen union assumes the duty to represent all employees "fairly, im-
partially, and in good faith." See Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
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serve as an adequate analogy; in such cases there is a deprivation of exist-
ing rights rather than a refusal to extend rights to a person in the first
place.10 The justification of the instant case can only arise from the fact
that, being a charity and the recipient of such benefits as the state bestows
on charities, the Y.W.C.A. is directly dedicated to the public welfare rather
than private ends. Although state power to intervene when an organi-
zation's practices are not in harmony with its chartered purposes applies
to all organizations incorporated under the corporation statutes, that power
may be more comprehensive when applied to charities, in view of their
peculiar relationship to the public.1 ' It would not necessarily follow, how-
ever, that any charity violates its chartered purposes by pursuing a re-
strictive membership policy. Indeed the instant decision is unique in that
relief is given to the plaintiffs without the court's holding that the member-
ship restrictions militate against the purposes of the Y.W.C.A. The court
in fact concluded that the objectives and purposes set forth in the charter
were being properly carried out by the defendant. Even in a case like the
present one, many of the benefits offered by the charity in pursuance of
its purposes are available to non-members, and the plaintiffs here had
been admitted to non-voting membership. Heretofore the public power
over an organization has been to prevent deviations from its general pur-
poses. The instant decision extends this power by holding that there is
a public right to take part in selecting the specific program by which those
purposes are to be effectuated. The extension is limited in this case, since
membership qualifications in the by-laws, although broad, had to be ful-
filled.12 Nevertheless, this is a step toward greater public rights with
respect to charities.
CITIZENSHIP-No REQUIREMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ELECTION UPON
ATTAINING MAJORITY FOR A DUAL NATIONAL RESIDING ABROAD WHO
RECEIVED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP BY JUS SOLI-Plaintiff was born in the
United States of alien parents on June 16, 1915. Two months later he
was taken by his parents to Italy, where he resided continuously until the
institution of this action in 1949. Upon attaining majority plaintiff made no
10. However, it has been persuasively argued that the injury to the interest of a
person excluded from membership in certain situations is as substantial as that to
members expelled. See Hewitt, The Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99
U. OF PA. L. REv. 919, 932 (1951).
11. See note 5 s'upra.
12. However, the instant decision is some authority for compelling admission of
persons who do not meet the requirements for voting membership, for two of the
plaintiffs here were not Protestant Evangelicals as required by a by-law. The court
did not face the issue of whether or not the religious restrictions were reasonable in
light of the purposes of the defendant organization.
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affirmative acts of election to retain his American citizenship,1 but thirteen
years thereafter brought this action against the Secretary of State to
obtain a declaration of his American citizenship. 2  The court held that
the plaintiff was a citizen because the requirement of election upon attain-
ing majority abroad did not apply where the dual national received Ameri-
can citizenship by jus soli. Tonwsicchio v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166
(D.C. 1951).
Loss of nationality is governed by the Nationality Act of 1940.3 The
provision of the Nationality Act which relates to loss of nationality by a dual
national for failure to elect upon attaining majority applies only to those
who have acquired dual nationality by naturalization or by the naturalization
of their parents in a foreign country.4  The Act says nothing about dual
nationals who have acquired a dual nationality at birth. The court in the
principal case found the Nationality Act to be exclusive; thus plaintiff did
not lose his citizenship by failing to elect upon attaining majority. But in
addition to the acts specified by the Nationality Act of 1940 that will
result in a loss of citizenship there exists a natural and inherent right of
voluntary expatriation which Congress has recognized.5 It is not clear
what acts, beyond those listed in the Act, would amount to such expatria-
tion.6 At common law there was no right of expatriation.7 The Supreme
Court, in the earliest cases, indicated that an individual might expatriate
himself with the consent of the government," but refused to make a final
determination of whether or not expatriation was a right.9 In 1797 Con-
gress attempted to define a method by which an individual might ex-
patriate himself,10 but the measure was tabled and never passed. Through-
1. Plaintiff did write a letter in 1937 to the American consul at Naples requesting
information "regarding repatriation." He never received an answer. Although this
may be considered poor manners on the part of the consul, it could not in any sense
be considered an act of election on the part of the plaintiff. See instant case at 168.
2. 54 STAT. 1171 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1946).
3. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801 (1946). The Act specifically provides:
"The loss of nationality under this chapter shall result solely from the performance
by a national of the acts or fulfillment of the conditions specified in this chapter." 54
STAT. 1171 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 808 (1946).
4. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801(a) (1946). This type of dual national
is what is commonly referred to as the Eig class, derived from Perkins v. Elg, 307
U.S. 325 (1938). In this case a young girl, born in the United States, was taken by
her parents during her minority to Sweden. Her father, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States, voluntarily renounced his American citizen-
ship upon his return to Sweden. The Court held that the father's repatriation did not
cause a loss of his daughter's citizenship because she had a right to elect which
citizenship she would take upon attaining majority, which right she had exercised.
5. Rv. STAT. § 1999 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 800 (1946).
6. This was evidently the Government's contention in its defense of this action,
i.e., that the plaintiff in failing to elect had exercised his right of expatriation. The
Government filed no brief but relied solely on Perkins v. Elg, supra note 4.
7. See MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 308 (1915).
8. See, e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133, 162 (U.S. 1795) (concurring opinion).
9. Cf. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (U.S. 1804); McIlvaine v.
Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch 209 (U.S. 1808).
10. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 348-349 (1797). The Federalists opposed the measure
because they followed the strict common law view that allegiance was permanent.
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out this early period both legislative and judicial discussions of expatria-
tion envisioned only one type of act on the part of the expatriate-a direct
renunciation of American citizenship with a concurrent departure from the
country. A proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution attempted
the first definition of automatic expatriation, when it sought to deprive of
citizenship anyone who accepted without the consent of Congress a title
of nobility, present, pension, office or emolument from any foreign power.'1
Proposed Congressional recognition of the right of expatriation was set
aside in subsequent years, partly from a conviction that expatriation was
a natural right and hence did not need legislative recognition.12 The
attitude of the Supreme Court, meanwhile, crystallized in the position that
a citizen could expatriate himself if, and only if, he did so with the consent
of the government. 13 This determination was not completely accepted by
the executive branch; the official opinions of the Attorneys General show
a trend toward the recognition of expatriation as a natural and inherent
right. 14 It was not until three years after the Civil War that Congress
finally recognized the natural and inherent right of expatriation.15 The
recognition, however, was general, without a definition of the means by
which the right might be exercised, and its interpretation fell to the ex-
ecutive branch. Such acts as emigrating to a foreign country with a bona-
fide intent to become a citizen thereof,16 accepting foreign public employ-
ment,17 engaging in foreign military services,' 8 and obtaining a foreign
passport' 9 were considered to be exercises of the right of expatriation.
The Department of State treated each case on its merits, 20 but the Depart-
ment did recognize the evolution of a general policy in handling individual
cases. It was within this policy that an election by a dual national minor
The "States Righters" refused to back the measure because they believed that ex-
patriation was a matter to be handled by the individual states, state citizenship being
the important one. Id. at 349-354. The proposed bill was almbst a copy of a Vir-
ginia statute of 1779. See 10 LAws OF VIRG NiA 129 (Hening 1779).
11. 10 U.S. LAWS 210 (1810). The proposed amendment passed both Houses and
fell but one state short of ratification.
12. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1041 (1817). See also id. at 1038-1039; and 13
ANNALS OF CONG. 1094, 1098 (1813).
13. Inglis v. Sailors Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99 (U.S. 1830); Shanks v. Dupont,
3 Pet. 242 (U.S. 1830). This principle was not uniformly accepted by the state
courts. See, e.g., Alsberry v. Hawkins, 9 Dana 177 (Ky. 1839).
14. See 8 0ps. ATr'Y GEN. 139 (1856) ; 9 Ops. Ar'rhY GEN. 62 (1857) ; 9 Ops.
ATr'y GEN. 356 (1859).
15. 15 STAT. 223 (1868). There was one attempt to deprive of citizenship any-
one who held any office civil or military, excluding ministerial offices, in the rebel
services. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1864). It was hurriedly pointed
out that if this were done, the expatriates would have a perfect defense to any trea-
son prosecution. Id. at 299.
16. 14 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 295 (1873).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 154.
20. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Washburne, Min. to France, June 28, 1873, cited in
3 MooaF, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 712 (1906).
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found its origin. With regard to the particular problem in the principal
case of a native born dual national minor, the failure to elect at majority
resulted in a loss of the right to protection of the government, while abroad,
but never in a loss of citizenship.21 In 1907 Congress placed the sanction
of loss of citizenship on two types of acts-naturalization in a foreign
country or oath of allegiance to a foreign power.22 This section of the
statute was actually the beginning of the principle of "loss of nationality."
The Nationality Act of 1940 expanded the list.
The court in the principal case made the only decision possible. There
is no foundation in the governing statute, administrative ruling, or judicial
precedent for reaching the opposite conclusion. The native-born dual
national minor is not covered by the provisions pertaining to loss of
nationality in the Nationality Act of 1940,2 and the State Department,
which was the author of the doctrine of the necessity of election by dual
nationals, has never ruled that the native born dual national lost his citizen-
ship for failing to elect.2 4  The only previous judicial determination of
this particular problem was made by the Supreme Court in the case of
Perkins v. Elg,25 the language of which seemed to indicate that election
was a proviso to a dual national minor's retention of American citizen-
ship.2 6 However, in that case the parents of the minor child were natural-
ized Americans who became repatriated, and the minor did elect 2 7 Nor
is there any possibility for grounding an opposite decision on any legis-
lative policy behind the Nationality Act of 1940. Congress, in considering
the Act, discussed the problem of the dual national born in the United
States of alien parents and deliberately omitted any express provision
covering it.28 As the law now stands a person born in the United States
of alien parents, who thereby acquires a dual nationality at birth, carries
his American citizenship to the grave, unless he performs some act to
21. See Flournoy, Dud Nationality and Electim, 30 YALE LJ. 545, 563 (1921).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service, originally a part of the Labor Depart-
ment and now a division of the Department of Justice has also ruled consistently
that a native born dual national minor does not have to elect at majority. See in the
Matter of R., 1 I. & N. DEc. 389 (B.I.A. 1943).
22. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907).
23: See note 4 supra.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. 307 U.S. 325 (1938).
26. Id. at 329.
27. Instant case at 170. This distinction seems quite proper in light of the fact
that Congress, in writing the Nationality Act of 1940, made this type of dual national
minor a class distinct from other types of dual nationals.
28. Hearings before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 6127,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1940). The reason given for the unwillingness to include
a provision covering the native born children of alien parents is some vague fear of
violating the Fourteenth Amendment. This fear seems especially mysterious, when
you consider that the Act may deprive the native born dual national of alien parents
of his citizenship if his parents later become naturalized American citizens and subse-
quently lose their American citizenship. These same native born dual national minors
are forced to make an election by section 407 of the Act in conjunction with section
404. 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §807 (1946).
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disaffirm it.29 The instant case is significant in its refusal to extend the
limits of expatriation; apparently the right of expatriation is still a limited
concept, and a citizen will not be held to have lost his citizenship by any
acts other than those specifically listed in the Nationality Act.
CORPORATIONS-SEcuRITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-INSME PROF-
ITS-A partnership realized a profit on the purchase and subsequent sale
within six months of stock of a corporation of which one of the partners
was a director. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provides that "for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by . . . [a corporate "insider"] any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale . . . of any security [of his
corporation] . . . within any period of less than six months . . shall
inure to . . . [the corporation]." 1 Although the director-partner paid
over to the corporation his share of the profit, plaintiff stockholder sued
him and the partnership under § 16(b) to recover for the corporation the
entire profit made by the partnership. The SEC filed an amicus curiae
brief in which it admitted defendants' motions should be granted under a
Commission Rule but urged the court to base its decision on the Rule alone
and not to adopt a construction of § 16(b) which might prevent a subse-
quent determination by the Commission that the section applies to all such
profits realized by a partnership. 2 Held, that § 16(b) requires the insider
to account for his share only of such partnership profits and imposes no
liability on his partners to account for their profits. In view of the plain
meaning and legislative history of the section there is no need to rely on
the Commission's Rule. Ratner v. Lehman, 98 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) .8 3 " 91
Section 16(b) was aimed at preventing persons with access to inside
corporate information from profiting at the expense of the general stock-
holder from whom such information is withheld. The specific purpose is
to discourage Abuse of such information where Congress found it most often
occurred, the short-swing transaction by the corporate insider himself.4
29. See Roche, The Loss of Anerican Natioiw1ty-The Development of Statil-
tory Expatriation, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 25, 32 (1950).
1. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1946).
2. Rule X-16A-3, 17 CoDE FED. REs. § 240.16a3: "Manner of reporting holdings
and changes in ownership under § 240.16a-1." The Rule was adopted under § 16(a)
of the Act which requires the "insider" to report changes in his holdings of his cor-
poration's securities. It provides that the partner-director may report only as to that
amount of the security which represents his proportionate interest in the partnership.
The SEC urged the court to construe the rule as an exercise of the power conferred
in the last sentence of § 16(b) to exclude from its operation such transactions as
the Commission may determine are not "comprehended within [its] purpose."
3. Appeal pending.
4. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 84, 72d Cong.,
and S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7741, 7742 (1934) ; SEN. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); Sen. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68
(1934).
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The judicial interpretations of § 16(b), few in number, show that the
courts have not hesitated to strain the ordinary meaning of the terms there
used in order to eliminate opportunities for the insider to profit personally
through such transactions. Thus a "purchase" of securities has been
deemed to include the acquisition of common stock through the exercise of
an option to convert preferred,5 and the receipt of stock warrants by an
insider in connection with an employment contract.6 But where the in-
sider's opportunity to profit personally has been indirect and largely
theoretical, the courts have refused to stretch the statutory language. Thus
gifts of stock 7 and stock warrants 8 by an insider have been held not to
constitute a "sale" of securities nor to result in a "profit" 9 to the insider
although it was admitted that such a transaction could result in tax saving.
Such a distinction is not based on a failure to realize that insiders may
yet misuse their information for the benefit of others. This can be done
by a gift of stock with instructions when to sell, or by merely passing
along the information. Where such information is pooled, an indirect
benefit to the insider results. Here the insider profits not only at the ex-
pense of the shareholders of his own corporation, but also at the expense
of the holders in his partners' corporations. Congress was aware of the
possibility of such an abuse. An earlier draft of § 16(b) contained a further
provision declaring it unlawful for an insider "to disclose, directly or in-
directly, any confidential information regarding or affecting any such
registered security not necessary or proper to be disclosed as a part of his
corporate duties." 10 It was also provided that any profits realized by
the person receiving the information could be recovered by the corporation."1
The interpretation sought by the SEC in the present case would give effect
to the purpose of this rejected provision in the case of partners. Since
the temptation for partners to pool confidential information is nearly as
strong as the temptation for the individual "insider" to misuse information
for his own benefit, and because a partner receives intangible benefits when
the partnership is benefited, the prophylactic nature of the remedy might
well be extended to the facts of the instant case. The same considerations
would not apply in the case of casual acquaintances, since tie relationship
there is less conducive to such pooling, and the informer is not benefited
5. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Kogan v. Schulte,
61 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1945).
6. Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). But cf. Shaw v.
Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949).
7. Shaw v. Dreyfus, supra note 6.
8. Truncale v. Blumberg, supra note 6.
9. Shaw v. Dreyfus, stpra note 6.
10. Hearing before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10 (1934). Hearings, supra note 4, at
6430. It was expressly stated that the purpose of the provision was to prevent just
such pooling of information. Hearings, supra note 4, at 6558.
11. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943). Ob-
jections to the provision in committee hearings were directed at its enforceability.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 6955, 6967, 6968.
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himself. However desirable such an extension of § 16(b) would be, it
cannot be made under the present wording of that section, for it not only
requires a real benefit to the insider, but requires also that the insider him-
self own the shares both at the time of purchase and when sold, and that
the corporation involved be his own. The torturing of the statutory lan-
guage necessary to uphold the SEC's contention that his partner's profits
are really the insider's profit is unwarranted when legislative history shows
that Congress considered and then rejected a provision which would have
imposed the same liability as that advocated by the Commission. In such
circumstances it must be supposed that failure to use terms capable of elastic
interpretation is due to a restrictive intent rather than to oversight. Since,
by its own rulings on companion sections of the Act,12 the SEC apparently
took a similarly restricted view of § 16(b), the unanimity of thought on the
scope of that section as it now stands leaves little room for argument.
DIVORCE-EVIDENCE OF ADULTERY BY RESPONDENT Is ADmISSIBLE IN
A DIVORCE TRIAL BASED ON INDIGNITIES TO THE PERSoN-Husband sued
for a divorce on the ground of indignities to his person. About two months
after he commenced his suit he learned that several weeks prior to their
separation respondent had spent a night in a hotel room with another man.
The trial court admitted evidence of this incident and granted a divorce
on the ground of indignities. Respondent based her appeal on the theory
that evidence of adultery is not admissible where the libel is founded on
indignities to the person, and secondly, since husband was unaware of the
alleged act at the time of the commencement of the suit, it could not have
been an indignity to him. The Supreme Court affirmed a unanimous
Superior Court 1 and ruled that the evidence of adultery was properly
admitted. Phipps v. Phipps, 368 Pa. 291, 81 A.2d 523 (1951).
Because of the rule of the Hexamer case 2 that a libellant can not have
a decree of divorce upon any ground other than that alleged in his libel,
the court in the instant case could not grant a divorce on the ground of
adultery, but had to determine whether an act of adultery was relevant to
a charge of indignities. In the past many divorces have been granted upon
the assumption that a wife's conduct with another man or a husband's
conduct with another woman could constitute an indignity to the innocent
spouse.3 In at least one of these cases the evidence indicated that the re-
12. See note 2 supra.
1. Phipps v. Phipps, 165 Pa. Super. 622, 70 A.2d 415 (1950).
2. 42 Pa. Super. 226 (1910).
3. McKrell v. McKrell, 352 Pa. 173, 42 A.2d 609 (1945) ; Wick v. Wick, 352 Pa.
25, 42 A.2d 76 (1945) ; Blansett v. Blansett, 162 Pa. Super. 45, 56 A.2d 341 (1948) ;
Smith v. Smith, 175 Pa. Super. 582, 43 A.2d 371 (1945) ; Lowe v. Lowe, 148 Pa.
Super. 439, 25 A.2d 781 (1942); Dearth v. Dearth, 141 Pa. Super. 344, 15 A.2d 37
(1940).
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spondent's conduct was of such a nature that a divorce on the grounds of
adultery might have been granted.4 Since both the Supreme and Superior
Courts have recognized that a respondent's conduct with one other than
the spouse might be a form of personal indignity, it would seem logical
that adultery, the most reprehensible extra-marital affair, would constitute
an indignity. However, in Allen v. Allen, the Superior Court held that,
although "adultery in fact is an indignity in its gravest form," 5 evidence
of adultery was inadmissible on the charge of indignities and should have
been disregarded even tholigh in evidence without objection. The theory
was that the legislature, by making adultery a separate ground for divorce 6
and prohibiting the marriage of the respondent to the paramour,7 had pre-
cluded the court from admitting evidence of adultery to support a libel
on the ground of indignities.8 Six months later the same court sustained
the admission of the evidence of adultery in the instant case, 9 and the
Supreme Court affirmed, overruling the Allen case.
Although the ultimate effect of this case will depend largely upon what
conduct in addition to an act of adultery will be necessary to permit the
granting of a divorce on the grounds of indignities to the person,' 0 the
holding is significant in its effect on the rules of adultery as a grounds for
divorce. First, adultery is difficult to prove and a libellant is not, by this
decision, denied the benefit of evidence of conduct by the respondent which
might not be quite sufficient to cause the granting of a divorce on the
ground of adultery. Second, the law provides that libellant's own adultery
is a complete defense to a charge of adultery," whereas it is a defense to
indignities only if it has provoked the indignities.12 Under the instant
decision a libellant, by charging indignities and proving an act of adultery,
may prevent the respondent from alleging as-a defense libellant's own
adultery unless it has provoked respondent's misconduct. Third, the
4. Macormac v. Macormac, 159 Pa. Super. 378, 48 A.2d 136 (1946).
5. 165 Pa. Super. 379, 380, 67 A.2d 629, 630 (1949).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(c) (Purdon, 1930).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon, 1930).
8. 165 Pa. Super. 379, 67 A.2d 629 (1950).
9. Phipps v. Phipps, 165 Pa. Super. 622, 70 A.2d 415 (1950).
10. In the instant case the court said "We hold, therefore, that evidence of a
respondent's adultery is admissible on a charge of indignities. How far such evi-
dence goes in helping to establish a course of conduct, requisite to sustaining a charge
of indignities, is for the fact finder to appraise subject, of course, to appellate review
for legal sufficiency of the evidence. But the evidence is admissible, nonetheless,
even though it falls short of supporting a charge of indignities." Instant case at 295,
81 A.2d at 524. This indicates that the court would require misconduct in addition
to an act of adultery to cause the granting of a divorce on the ground of indignities,
but it set no precise standard. Courts in future cases may grant a divorce on the
ground of indignities even when the only misconduct shown is a single act of adultery.
On the other hand the courts may take the opposite view and decide that an act of
adultery is a significant but small factor in establishing a course of conduct which
renders the innocent spouse's condition intolerable and life unbearable.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 52 (Purdon, 1930).
12. Clark v. Clark, 160 Pa. Super. 562, 566, 52 A.2d 351, 353, (1947); Bock
v. Bock, 162 Pa. Super. 506, 58 A.2d 372 (1948).
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statute which prohibits the marriage of the respondent and the paramour
during the life of the innocent spouse 1 3 might be circumvented by follow-
ing the rule of the instant case. That statute is probably a very slight
deterrent to those who would commit adultery, and, positing a divorce, it
seriously restrains freedom of marriage since often the one person the
respondent is desirous of marrying is the corespondent. Also many of
the divorces sought on the grounds of adultery are contested only because
of this rule. Thus the effect of the instant case is to render at least par-
tially ineffective the present restrictions on adultery as a grounds for
divorce. If this is indirect judicial legislation it nevertheless represents a
broadening of judicial refusal to force the continuance of marriages that
are already beyond repair. The strongest argument against the decision
is the Rule of Civil Procedure which provides that the corespondent, if
named in an adultery suit, be given notice and an opportunity to be heard, 14
thus enabling him to clear his name.15 However, the Supreme Court
could promulgate a rule that if evidence of adultery is admitted in a divorce
trial on the grounds of indignities and the paramour is identified by the
pleadings or the evidence, he be given notice of the fact and an opportunity
to be heard.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-VALIDITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE Au-
THORIZING GARDEN APARTMENTS WITHIN A SINGLE DWELLING DISTRICT
-Plaintiff was the owner of a residence situated near defendant's property.
The area in which both properties were located was zoned for single
family dwellings by an ordinance which divided the entire village into
seven districts according to a comprehensive plan.1 In 1947 a zoning
amendment was enacted creating a new district for the erection of garden
apartments. This new district included the entire village so that any prop-
erty comprising ten acres or more was eligible to be rezoned within it.
In 1948 a second zoning amendment was enacted which placed the de-
fendant's property within the multiple dwelling district created by the first
amendment. Hence the second amendment authorized the construction of
ten multi-family dwellings in the center of an area exclusively dedicated to
single family residences. Plaintiff brought this action to have the two
amendments declared invalid and to enjoin the construction of garden
apartments on defendant's property. The Court of Appeals of New York
upheld the validity of the amendments on the grounds that defendant's
property was rezoned to promote the general welfare and that plaintiff
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon, 1930).
14. PA. R. Civ. PRoc. 1136, superseding PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 38 (Purdon,
1930).
15. In the instant case the alleged paramour appeared and denied the alleged act
of adultery.
1. General Zoning Ordinance, Tarrytown, N.Y., June 12, 1944. One of these
districts was devoted to multiple dwellings and apartment houses.
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had not shown the action to be arbitrary. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown,
302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
To be a valid exercise of the police power, zoning regulations must
be within the limits of state enabling acts, and also must be drawn along
comprehensive lines.2  Comprehensive zoning is the division of a com-
munity into districts, each having its limited uses, so that an orderly de-
velopment of the entire community may be achieved. If zoning ordinances
are drawn to effect the purposes set forth in the state enabling acts, and
the limitations established upon property uses after an investigation bear
a reasonable relation to the prosperity of the whole community, they will
be upheld by the courts as comprehensive zoning plans.3 However it is
necessary that provision be made for the reclassification of either particular
properties or entire districts. Enabling acts provide that any persons
aggrieved by the restrictions of zoning ordinances may seek relief from a
board of appeals. 4  One is entitled to a modification of the ordinance as
applied to him who can show that due to unique circumstances his property
cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that
zone. 5 Of course such an amendment may rezone a particular property
alone just as it may rezone an entire area, so long as the general welfare
of the community demands the change.6 Since there is a presumption that
original use districts are well arranged and were planned with foresight,
2. See Morrill Realty Corporation v. Rayon Holding Corporation, 254 N.Y. 268,
172 N.E. 49 (1930). The great majority of states use the model zoning act pub-
lished by the Department of Commerce: A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING
AcT, 1926, found in RATHKoPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 547 (1949).
The New York village zoning law is found in N.Y. CONsoi. LAWS ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 175-179 (McKinney, 1951). It authorizes the legislative body of a village to
establish building zones "for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or
the general welfare of the community"; to "divide the village into districts of such
number . . . as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act"
and within such districts to "regulate and restrict the erection . . . or use of build-
ings, structures or land"; to make such regulations "in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan." See RATeKOFF, op. cit. supra, § 2-7, Supplement and Digest (2d ed.
1951). For a discussion of the aims of zoning law see Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
3. See Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra; Davis v. Nolte, 231 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.
1950) ; Kuehne v. Town of E. Hartford, 136 Conn. 452, 72 A.2d 474 (1950). In the
absence of a showing to the contrary a legislative body, in this case the village
Board of Trustees, is presumed to have acted in conformity with the enabling act
and the presumption exists that the ordinance bears a substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, or public welfare of the community. Accord, Mundelein Estates v.
Village of Mundelein, 99 N.E.2d (Ill. 1951) ; see Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles,
300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949).
4. For an enumeration of the powers vested in a board of appeals in New York
villages see N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. tit. 63, § 179b (McKinney, 1951).
5. Matter of Taxpayers' Assn. v. Board of Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E.2d
545 (1950); In Bazinsky v. Kesbec, Inc., 259 App. Div. 467, 472, 19 N.Y.S.2d 716,
720 (1st Dep't 1940) ; "The purpose of a variance from zoning ordinances is to afford
a safety valve so that carrying out of the strict letter of a zoning ordinance may not
occasion unnecessary hardship to particular property owners, but the necessity of ob-
serving the spirit of the ordinance in maintaining public welfare and safety persists,
even where the variance is granted."
6. In the case of an amendment hardship to particular individuals is not an im-
portant factor if the community welfare dictates a change. See Rommell v. Walsh,
127 Conn. 272, 278, 16 A.2d 383, 385, 386 (1940).
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the power to amend requires that the original zoning was unreasonable or
that the complexion of the area or the community as a whole has changed
so that the area, whether it be an entire district or merely one property,
ought to be rezoned.7 There are many times when the public welfare re-
quires the rezoning of a particular parcel of land within an exclusive resi-
dential district.8  If not reasonably related to the community welfare
viewed comprehensively, rezoning of individual properties is invalid as
"spot zoning." 9
While it is true that".. changing conditions call for changed plans,
and persons . . . enjoy no eternally vested right to [a] classification if
the public interest demands otherwise," 10 it is a well established principle
of comprehensive zoning that residents have a right to rely upon the
proposition that their zone will not be reclassified in whole or in part unless
genuine changes necessitate it." The instant case is out of harmony with
these principles because the first amendment repudiated the existing zoning
plan, which had zoned another defined area in the town for apartment
houses, by naking any ten acre parcel in the entire town a potential apart-
ment site. This was done without a showing that the housing problem
in the village demanded such a change. Such a procedure is beyond the
power granted by the state enabling act to divide the village into districts
according to a comprehensive plan. 2 The first amendment set up the
machinery for "spot zoning," and the second amendment accomplished it
by allowing defendant to construct garden apartments. No evidence was
adduced to the effect that congestion and overcrowding in the original
apartment house area necessitated the rezoning of defendant's parcel. The
first amendment drove a wedge into the comprehensive village zoning plan
and provided the legislative body with the means of amending particular
properties for apartment use without the showing of community necessity.
The decision sanctions an unprecedented device by which a local legislative
body may exercise great discretion in permitting the construction of certain
types of buildings anywhere in the community rather than in a zoned
area.
31
7. Kracke v. Weinberg, 79 A.2d 387 (Md. 1951); Cf. Shepard v. Village of
Skaneateles, supra, note 3 illustrates the correction of a zoning classification as ap-
plied to a single property which was mistakenly zoned by the original ordinance.
8. Higbee v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry. Co. 235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W.
320 (1940) (railroad station built within residential zone); Lamarre v. Comm'r of
Public Works, 324 Mass. 452, 87 N.E.2d, 211 (1949) (apartment house built within
a single dwelling zone to alleviate housing shortage).
9. Cassel v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 73 A.2d 486 (Md. 1950);
Cassinari v. Union City, 2 N.J. 112, 63 A.2d 891 (1949) ; Davis v. Nolte, 231 S.W.2d
471 (Tex. 1950).
10. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 121, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733
(1951).
11. See Kennedy v. City of Evanston, 348 Ili. 426, 429, 181 N.E. 312, 313 (1932).
12. N.Y. CoNsoL LAWS ANN. tit. 63, § 176, 177 (McKinney, 1951). See 3
ZONING DIGEST 33 (1951) which calls the instant decision a "demoralization" of
zoning.
13. The court might have reached the conclusion that properly designed garden
apartments blend harmoniously in a single dwelling area and are in effect substantially
the same as single homes.
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TRADE-MARKs--LAcHES AS A DEFENSE IN A CANCELLATION PRO-
CEEDING WHEN PETITIONER HAS No ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE Ex-
ISTENCE OF THE MARK SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED--Petitioner, claiming
use since 1922, registered the trade-mark "Graphol" in 1925.' Re-
spondent,. claiming use since 1933, registered the marks "Grafo" and
"Grafolube" in 1934.2 Pursuant to section 13 of the Trade-Mark Act of
1905,3 petitioner began cancellation proceedings in 1944. Until that time,
when a search of the register was made, it had no actual knowledge of the
use and registration of respondent's marks; neither did respondent have
any knowledge of petitioner's mark. Both parties had used their marks
continuously; both claimed distribution over the entire United States. The
petitions were sustained by the Examiner of Interferences, who was affirmed
by the Commissioner of Patents.4 The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held on appeal that, although petitioner had no actual knowledge
of respondent's registrations, these registrations constituted constructive
notice of respondent's claim and that, because of the lapse of ten years 5
and the consequent injury to respondent, petitioner was precluded by
laches from cancelling the marks. Although petitioner's registration was
constructive notice to respondent, it did not affect respondent's claim of
use in good faith and, thus, prevent him from setting up laches as a de-
fense. The court felt that requiring an applicant to search for prior inter-
fering registrations would transfer the duty of searching applications from
the Patent Office to the applicant. Willson v. Graphol Products Co., 188
F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
There have been no decisions concerning the effect of registrations
under the Act of 1905 as constructive notice in cancellation proceedings.
In a number of infringement cases decided prior to the Lanham Trade-
Mark Act of 1946,8 it was held that these registrations do not constitute
1. Registration No. 194,841, applied to "Rust Solvent and Penetrating Lubricant."
2. Registration Nos. 316,676 and 310,077, applied to "Lubricating Oil Com-
pounds."
3. 33 STAT. 728 (1905), 15 U.S.C. §93 (1934). "Whenever any person shall
deem himself injured by the registration of a trade-mark in the Patent Offici he may
at any time apply to the Commissioner of Patents to cancel the registratioh
thereof. . . ." This is now materially amended by 60 STAT. 433, 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(1946) ; 60 STAT. 435, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1068, 1070 (1946).
4. 83 U.S.P.Q. 2 (1949). This case came before the Commissioner twice.
Originally the Examiner found for petitioner, and was affirmed by the Commissioner.
69 U.S.P.Q. 18 (1946). On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals re-
manded the case to permit the taking of additional evidence because it found that
§ 19 of the Lanham Act was applicable. 165 F.2d 446 (C.C.P.A. 1946). Section 19
reads as follows: "In all inter partes proceedings equitable principles of laches,
estoppel, and acquiescence, where applicable may be considered and applied. The
provisions of this section shall also govern proceedings heretofore begun in the
Patent Office and not finally determined." 60 STAT. 434, 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1946).
5. None of the three marks was republished under section 12 (c) of the Lanham
Act, 60 STAT. 432, 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1946). Therefore, the incontestability pro-
visions of § 15 of the Act, 60 STAT. 433, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1946), are not applicable
to the present case.
6. 60 STAT. 427, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1946).
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such constructive notice as to permit the registrant to secure an injunction
against future infringement by one whose use had developed innocently
in an area in which plaintiff had not traded.7 Two judicial views have
been expressed upon the availability of laches in cancellation proceedings.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, predecessor to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, concluded that this equitable defense
could be applied in these proceedings.8 However, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals held that the words "at any time" 9 in section 13 of
the Act of 1905 precluded respondents from setting up laches as a defense.10
It was to eliminate this interpretation that section 19,11 making laches
available in inter partes proceedings, was inserted into the Lanham Act 
12
and made specifically available in actions pending at the time when the
Act was passed.' 3 In the present case, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals holds the defense of laches valid in a cancellation proceeding for
the first time. More important, it sustains that defense where neither
party had actual knowledge of the other's registration. Thus, while re-
fusing to place upon a registrant the duty of searching prior registrations
in the Patent Office, it requires him to search all registrations subsequent
to his own or risk being held guilty of laches when he petitions for cancella-
tion of a later mark.' 4 And when the respondent in a cancellation pro-
ceeding has no actual knowledge of the earlier conflicting registration, and
asserts the defense of laches, this case relieves him from alleging and prov-
ing actual knowledge of his mark on the part of petitioner.
If the present case is read in the light of section 22 of the Lanham
Act, the court's refusal to require applicants to search the registers for
interfering marks is questionable. That section provides in part that
registrations on the principal register under the Act of 1905 or the Lanham
Act shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of
the mark.' 5 Although in effect at the time of the present decision, section
7. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918);-U.S. Print-
ing and Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper and Co., 279 U.S. 156 (1929).
8. Gerstendorfer Bros. v. United Supply Co., 26 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
9. See note 3 supra.
10. Cluett, Peabody and Co. v. Hartogensis (Arrow Emblem Co., Substituted),
41 F.2d 94 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
11. See note 4 supra.
12. Hearings before Committee on Patents, Sub-committee on Trade-Marks, on
HR. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 153, 154 (1941).
13. See note 4 supra.
14. Absent this case, some search of subsequent registrations will be necessary
if the trade-mark owner wishes to prevent interfering registrations from becoming
incontestable under section 15 of the Lanham Act. However, no such search need be
made for over four years after the effective date of the Act, and, even then, it does
not have to include registrations which have not been republished under the Lanham
Act. See note 5 supra.
15. 60 STAT. 435, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1946) : "Registration of a mark on the prin-
cipal register provided by this chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of
ownership thereof."
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22 was not applicable to it since this case was pending at the effective date
of the Act.1 6 Registrations under the Act of 1905 are now constructive
notice by authority of section 22 as well as by authority of the present case.
The danger, however, is that the instant decision may serve as precedent
for a restrictive interpretation of section 22; free use of laches may negate
the constructive notice provisions of section 22 and give advantages to sub-
sequent, rather than prior, registrants.
The Lanham Act was intended to create a complete public record of
trade-marks 'I and, like all trade-mark legislation, to eliminate and prevent
the use and registration of misleading marks.' 8 Section 22 was designed
to effect this last end by requiring applicants to search the registers for
prior conflicting registrations.' By so doing, a prospective user and
registrant may locate interferences and refrain from adopting marks which
will prove confusingly similar to previous ones. 20 It was intended, under
this provision, that use of a registered mark could not be a use in good
faith,2 ' for the user would have constructive notice that the rights to the
mark were claimed by the registrant. Under laches law, such a user
could seldom set up that equitable defense in a cancellation proceeding.
2 2
With the advent of section 22, the availability of laches where petitioner
has no actual knowledge of respondent's mark should become still more
infrequent since sustaining it excuses the respondent from searching prior
registrations, the very duty which section 22 places upon him. In addition,
sustaining the defense leaves confusingly similar marks (in the present
case three) in use and upon the register. Perhaps the present case ex-
emplifies those few instances in which, because of extreme hardship, laches
will be upheld despite the statutory intent to require search of prior regis-
trations. Even if this be true, the case should be recognized as an excep-
tion to the general rule, and should not be interpreted as precedent for the
proposition that applicants are not obliged to search the registers for prior
interfering registrations.
16. 60 STAT. 444 (1946) : "This Act shall be in force and take effect one year
from its enactment, but except as otherwise herein specifically provided shall not affect
any suit, proceeding, or appeal then pending. ... "
17. See Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act in 15 U.S.C.A.
(§§81-111) 265, 268 (1948).
18. SEN. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
19. RoBERT, NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 129, 130 (1947) ; Halliday, Constructive
Notice and Concurrent Registration, 38 T.M. REP. 111, 120 (1948).
20. Martin, Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark Act, 36 T.M.
REP. 21 (1946).
21. RoBERT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 129; Halliday, supra note 19, at 119;
Martin; sipra note 20, at 216.
22. Intentional use of another's mark will seldom support the defense of laches.
Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888). The user, having constructive knowledge
of the registration of the previous mark, would be intentionally using the mark of
another.
RECENT CASES
WAREHOUSEMEN-UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AcT-WARE-
HOUSEMAN'S LIEN-A fishing company delivered to a warehouseman in
Massachusetts various lots of fish for freezing and storage. The ware-
houseman issued the fishing company a non-negotiable warehouse receipt
for each lot. When the fishing company went bankrupt, the warehouseman
claimed a lien on the eleven lots of fish remaining in his possession for the
due and unpaid charges for processing and storing these eleven lots and
for the total amount due and unpaid on the general account. The general
account represented charges for processing and storing other lots of fish
not stored at the same time or under the same contract as the eleven lots 1
and withdrawn prior to bankruptcy. The referee in bankruptcy determined
that the lien was specific and hence restricted to the charges on the eleven
lots only. The district court affirmed. On the warehouseman's appeal,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that under the Massa-
chusetts version of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 2 a warehouseman
has a general lien. Harbor View Marine Corp. v. Braudy, 189 F.2d 481
(1st Cir. 1951).
A specific lien attaches to specific property in the lienholder's posses-
sion as security for claims in respect to that property only, and may not be
exercised against any other property, or against the specific property for
claims in respect to any other property.3 A general lien may be enforced
against any property in the lienholder's possession, as security for claims
in respect to any property of which the lienholder has had possession even
if he has since surrendered it, i.e., for a general balance of accounts. 4 Gen-
eral liens were not favored by the common law,5 under which a warehouse-
man's lien was specific only.8 Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act in 1906, however, New York and Michigan had enacted
statutes giving warehousemen a general lien.7 The Uniform Act is now
in effect in every state." The sections of the Act relevant to the existence
of a lien do not expressly state whether the lien is specific or general, nor
do the Commissioner's Notes on these sections shed any light on the
matter.9 Section 30 of the Act provides, "If a negotiable receipt is issued
1. Record, p. 4.
2. 1 MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 105, §§ 7-66 (1921) ; UNIFORM WAREHousE EcEn-'s
AcT, 3 UN. LAws ANN. (1922).
3. 1 JoNEs, LIENs § 14 (3d ed. 1914).
4. Id., § 17.
5. ". . . They [general liens] are encroachments upon the common law . .
Rushforth v. Hadfield, 7 East 224, 229, 103 Eng. Rep. 86, 88 (K.B. 1806).
6. E.g., Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 W. & S. 466 (Pa. 1844) (holding that a ware-
houesman has a specific lien); Shingleur-Johnson & Co. v. Canton Warehouse Co.,
78 Miss. 875, 29 So. 770 (1901) (holding that the lien is not general).
7. N.Y. Laws 1885, c. 526, § 1; Stallman v. Kimberly, 121 N.Y. 393, 24 N.E. 939
(1890) ; Mich. Laws 1887, c. 127, § 2; Kaufman v. Leonard, 139 Mich. 104, 102 N.W.
632 (1905).
8. 3 UN. LAws ANN. 6 (Supp. 1950).
9. The Commissioners' Note to § 27 states that "This extends the common
law, but has the precedent of other statutes . . ." and cites various state statutes.
This statement is ambiguous as to whether the lien is general or specific because
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for goods, the warehouseman shall have no lien thereon, except for charges
for storage of those goods subsequent to the date of the receipt, unless the
receipt expressly enumerates other charges for which a lien is claimed
P ., 10 Thus, when the negotiable receipt does not expressly enumerate
other charges, the lien allowed by § 30 is specific only.1 Section 30 also
provides that if other charges are expressly enumerated, there shall be a
lien for them ". . . so far as they are within the terms of Section 27,
although the amount of the charges so enumerated is not stated in the
receipt." In State Bank of Wilbur v. Almira Farmers' Warehouse Co.,12
it was held that a warehouseman had a general lien on goods represented
by a negotiable receipt when the types of charges for which the lien was
asserted were noted thereon. Since § 30 restricts rather than expands the
provisions of § 27, it would follow from this decision that § 27 permits a
general lien. With regard to a non-negotiable receipt, it is not necessary
that the charges for which a lien is asserted be noted on the receipt,'3 and
one case holds that a warehouseman has a general lien on goods repre-
sented by a non-negotiable receipt for advances not expressly enumerated
thereon.' 4 Dicta to the effect that the Uniform Act gives warehousemen
a general -lien are found in four other cases. 15 Such treatment of the Act
is not universal. Two cases hold that warehousemen do not have a gen-
eral lien under the Act ' and two other cases contain dicta to the same
§ 27 extends the lien to expenses of sale of the goods and to the proceeds of such
sales, and the warehouseman's lien at common law, like all other common law liens,
conferred no right to sell the goods, but only to detain them. 1 JONES, LIENS
§ 976 (3d ed. 1914). Of the statutes cited, two (N.Y. Laws 1897, art. 6, c. 418,
§ 73; Mich. Laws 1897, c. 127, § 2) provided for general liens, and two (IDAHo REV.
STAT. § 3445 (1887) ; IOWA CODE § 3129 (1897)) provided for specific liens, and the
others did not provide explicitly for either type of lien and had not been construed
by the courts on this subject. Professor Williston says that the lien is general. 4
WIU.IsTox, CoxTRacTs § 1058, n.2 (Rev. Ed. 1938).
10. The purpose of this provision, as explained in the Commissioners' Notes
(UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcEI~s AcT §§ 30, 2, Commissioners' Notes, 3 UK. LAws
ANN. (1922)), is to restrict the warehouseman's lien on goods represented by nego-
tiable receipts so that the lien will not impair the credit of such receipts.
11. Wilson Distilling Co. v. Foust Distilling Co., 51 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Pa.
1943) ; Klock Produce Co. v. Diamond Ice & Storage Co., 90 Wash. 67, 155 Pac.
414 (1916); Metropolitan Commercial Corp. v. Larkin Co., 257 App. Div. 612, 15
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1939).
12. 123 Wash. 354, 212 Pac. 543 (1923).
13. Boas v. De Pue Warehouse Co., 69 Cal.App. 246, 230 Pac. 980 (Dist. Ct.
of App. 1924); contra, Collins v. Kent Storage Co., 228 Mich. 137, 199 N.W. 634
(1924) (alternative holding). See UNIFOR-m WAREHousE REcEIs ACT .2, Com-
missioner's Note, 3 Um. LAws ANN. (1922), from which it appears that this branch
of the Collins case is bad law.
14. San Angelo Wine & Spirits Corp. v. South End Warehouse Co., 19
Cal.App.2d 749, 61 P.2d 1235 (Super. Ct., App. Dept. 1936).
15. See In re Taub, 7 F.2d 447, 451 (2d Cir. 1925); Roehl Storage Co. v.
Wilson, 268 Mich. 691, 696, 256 N.W. 598, 600 (1934); Klock Produce Co. v.
Diamond Ice & Storage Co., 90 Wash. 67, 69, 155 Pac. 414, 415 (1916) ; Metro-
politan Commercial Corp. v. Larkin Co., 257 App. Div. 612, 614, 15 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20
(1939).
16. Bewley Mills v. First Nat. Bank, 110 S.W.2d 201, 204, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) (alternative holding); Mercer v. Shiver, 81 Ga. App. 815, 60 S.E.2d 263
(1950).
RECENT CASES
effect. 17 In view of such differences, it is noteworthy that the Uniform
Commercial Code provides a general lien for warehousemen.' s
As the court observed in the instant case,19 an inspection of § 28 of
the Uniform Act (which lists the property against which the lien may be
enforced) readily shows that the Act provides a lien broader than a spe-
cific lien.20 The provision of § 29 that a warehouseman loses his lien
upon goods "by surrendering possession thereof" does not affect this result
as it is obviously not essential to a general lien that it can be enforced
against goods not in the warehouseman's possession; it is only necessary
that it can be enforced against goods in the warehouseman's possession
for charges due upon goods out of the warehouseman's possession. There
is an alternative reading of the statute, however, which would give a ware-
houseman a lien on any of the goods in his possession described in § 28,
but only for charges due on such goods and not for charges due on goods
out of the warehouseman's possession.21 This construction is supported
to a certain extent by the language of § 27, which enumerates the charges
for which a lien may be claimed. 22 The fact that no such lien was known
at common law,2 or provided by any statute before the drafting of the
Uniform Act,2 4 militates against such a construction. Moreover, the use-
17. See Fisk Rubber Co. v. Lawer Auto Supply, 35 Wyo. 283, 298, 248 Pac. 825,
829 (1926) ; Boas v. De Pue Warehouse Co., 69 Cal. App. 246, 250, 230 Pac. 980, 981
(Dist. Ct. of App. 1924).
18. UNiFOna COMmERcrAL CoD- § 7-209(1) (Prop. Final Draft No. 2, 1951).
19. Instant case at 484.
20. Section 28 provides, "Subject to the provisions of Section 30 [dealing with
negotiable receipts, quoted in text] a warehousemar's lien may be enforced:
"(a) Against all goods, whenever deposited, belonging to the person who is
liable as debtor for the claims in regard to which the lien is asserted, and
"(b) Against all goods belonging to others which have been deposited at any
time by the person who is liable as debtor for the claims in regard to which the
lien is asserted if such person had been so entrusted with the possession of the goods
that a pledge of the same by him at the time of the deposit to one who took the
goods in good faith for value would have been valid."
This is broader than the warehouseman's specific lien at common law, which
could not be enforced against goods deposited at any time, but only against goods
stored as part of the same bailment for charges due on that particular bailment.
1 JoNFs, LIENs §§ 967, 974 (3d ed. 1914).
21. For example: Articles A, B, and C are deposited in separate bailments.
Subsequently, article C is withdrawn. Charges are due upon all of these articles.
Under this construction, there is a lien on article A for the charges due not only
on article A, but also on article B-thus the lien is broader than a specific lien. There
is no lien on either article A or B for the charges due upon. article C which the
warehouseman no longer has-thus the lien is narrower than a general lien.
22. Thus, § 27 provides that ". . . a warehouseman shall have a lien on goods
deposited, or on the proceeds thereof in his hands, for all lawful charges for storage
and preservation of the goods; also for all lawful claims . . . in relation to such
goods . . ." (Italics supplied).
23. 1 JoNEs, LiENs §§ 14, 17 (3d ed. 1914).
24. Of the two statutes enacted prior to the drafting of the Uniform Act which
had been held to provide more than a specific lien, one (N.Y. Laws 1885, c. 526, § 1)
was held to confer a lien for charges on goods no longer in the warehouseman's
possession, against goods in the warehouseman's possession. Stallman v. Kimberly,
121 N.Y. 393, 24 N.E. 939 (1890). In the case construing the other statute (Mich.
Laws 1897, c. 127, § 2), the warehouseman had surrendered and regained possession
of the goods on which charges were due and upon which it was held he had a lien,
but the court did not base its decision on this facet of the case, resting solely on the
Stallhnan case, supra. Kaufman v. Leonard, 139 Mich. 104, 102 N.W. 632 (1905).
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fulness of such a lien would be little greater than that of a specific lien.
2 5
The possible alternatives of a specific or intermediate type lien being un-
warranted under the Act's provisions, the Court was justified in holding
that the Uniform Act provides a general lien in the instant case.
The general lien is primarily a means of collection from a bankrupt,
who by definition is unable to pay on his general account.2 6 Thus, con-
ferring a general lien upon warehousemen gives them a considerable ad-
vantage over other creditors. Specific liens are not open to this objection,
because in that case the goods are in the warehouseman's possession and
the other creditors get the advantage of the services which the warehouse-
man has performed in relation to these goods. The warehouseman is
therefore entitled to his charges before other creditors share in the pro-
ceeds of these goods. If the specific lien is for advances on these goods,
the warehouseman is still entitled to the lien, because he has relied upon
these goods as security for his advances. It is not true, however, that
warehousemen extend credit on the general account in reliance upon goods
in their possession as security. There has been no general opinion or
awareness among warehousemen that they have a general lien, and they
extend credit on the general account simply on their knowledge of the
financial stability of the depositor. It is doubtful that the decision in the
instant case will change business practice, because the usefulness of a
general lien is limited to large depositors,2 7 and a warehouseman will
hardly contemplate their insolvency in extending credit. There is there-
fore no good reason for giving warehousemen the advantage of a general
lien; 2 8 they should be required to contract for it by a pledge agreement
(which has not been their practice),29 just as any other creditor would
have to do.30
25. Ordinarily, the goods in the warehouseman's possession are at least equal in
value to the charges against them. The warehouseman will sell them if he finds that
the value has descended to this point, as he then knows that the depositor will not call
for them. Only a sudden and drastic fall in price, an unexpected and serious deteriora-
tion or destruction of the goods, or attachment, would render this intermediate type
of lien useful.
26. A general lien is not of much use against small depositors (such as depositors
of household goods) as this business is one-time storage and there is little likelihood
that, if goods are withdrawn without payment, the warehouseman will have goods
from the same depositor in the future. Liens, general or specific, are not used against
large depositors (who are likely to be continuously depositing and withdrawing
goods) unless they go bankrupt, because otherwise they can and will pay all charges
in order to preserve their credit.
27. See note 26 supra.
28. This argument does not support the intermediate type of lien mentioned, be-
cause even if the warehouseman loses the value of a specific lien without fault, there
is no reason why he should be allowed to pass his loss on to the other creditors, who
will not gain by his loss.
29. See BPAuciiER AND COMR, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL LAw 111-115
(1950).
30. It is well settled that a czontract of pledge, if appropriately worded, may secure
a general balance of accounts. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Securities
Corp. v. W. L. Shepherd Lumber Co., 51 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1931); Commercial &
Savings Bank v. Robert H. Jenks Lumber Co., 194 Fed. 732 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1911).
